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Abstract 
Electromagnetic interference can degrade civil Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals 
and services, and in some cases result in integrity failures. The aviation community is well-aware of 
such threats due to the proliferation of interfering-capable equipment including personal electronic 
devices (PEDs), personal privacy devices (PPDs), GNSS repeaters, mis-operated test equipment, 
low-cost software-defined radio cards, and the foreseeable proliferation of more sophisticated 
spoofing devices in the future. Protection against such interference is under consideration for the 
next-generation of avionics standards. 
 
This paper is intended to support the definition of new avionics standards that address these 
interference threats. First, it provides a current review of the technical literature with a focus on 
aviation. Then, the paper compiles the existing nomenclature, taking into account definitions from 
regulatory bodies. Next, the paper identifies categories of threat emissions.  Later, the assets to 
protect and use case under analysis are presented, followed by a discussion of detection and 
mitigation responses. The paper continues with a list of detection and mitigation actions that can be 
implemented at different stages of the avionics receiver. Finally, the paper concludes with a  
discussion on possible treatment of specific threat categories in the next generation of standards. 
   
This paper is intended to provide a framework for discussing standards, recommended practices, 
and test procedures for the treatment of emissions that may be encountered by future equipment. 
Common nomenclature and threat categorization of jamming and spoofing threats was not available 
prior to this effort. The framework is the result of several months of iterations including research 
institutes, GNSS providers, and air navigation service providers. This work provides a common 
framework that can be used for threat modeling and quantitative risk analysis to enable 
development of future requirements and associated test procedures in the next generation of 
aviation standards. 
 
 
Background  
This section presents a short review on general radio frequency interference, with a focus on the 
treatment of interference, jamming and spoofing threats in current aviation standards. 
GPS/Galileo/GNSS radio frequency interference has been a subject of study since the beginning of 
GPS [1]. In 2001, the Volpe Report [2] provided a wide assessment of the impact of GPS 
disruptions in critical applications, including aviation, which increased awareness of the 
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consequences of such disruptions. Since then, a wealth of literature focused on GNSS interference, 
but with different ways to classify interference were produced [3] [4] [5]. For example, reference 
[3] classifies GNSS interference as wideband or narrowband, where these two types include 
waveforms, such as harmonics from other band signals, energy spillover from adjacent bands, and 
intentional, in-band interference such as chirp jammers, pseudolites or spoofers. On the other hand, 
another reference [4] treats interference depending upon whether the interference is statistically 
independent from GNSS signals and its effect can be approximated by an increase in thermal noise, 
or whether the interference is correlated with GNSS signals and is assimilated as spoofing. This 
reference also presents canonical interference models as wideband, narrowband, the main case 
being CW (Continuous Waveform), or matched spectrum, and presents typical interference 
waveforms, including natural interference, such as solar bursts or scintillation, or man-made, 
including unintentional, accidental interference, and spoofing. This natural vs. man-made 
interference distinction is also presented in other references, such as reference [6].  
 
The ICAO SARPS ( [7], APP-B) treats unintentional interference in avionics receivers by defining 
CW interference masks, and accepted noise-like interference thresholds vs. bandwidth (Figs B-
15/18) for different flight phases. For example, receivers must function in the presence of in-band 
CW interference below -150.5 dBW for GPS C/A-code tracking. RTCA SC-159 Minimum 
Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) define a Standard Received Signal and Interference 
Environment (SBAS MOPS [8], Appendix C) and propose test procedures for acquisition in the 
presence of interference and interference rejection (S2.5.4 and S2.5.7, respectively), although 
reduced to CW. The FAA GNSS Intentional Interference and Spoofing Study Team (GIISST) 
studied potential means to deal with new threats and then divided the threats into intentional 
interference and spoofing [9].  
 
With regard to interference caused by jamming, the signals and effects of many typical jammers are 
analyzed in several references [10] [11] [12] [13]. Reference [14] reports on the delayed use of a 
new aviation service in order to allow ground system improvements to mitigate the effects of such 
illegal signals. While many reported jammers of these types use swept-tone signals, a more recent 
monitoring of jammers reported in reference [15] shows a wide variety of jammer fingerprints. A 
recording platform for different jamming events as well as an analysis is described in [16]. Jamming 
countermeasures depend upon the jamming emission type: Automatic Gain Control (AGC) and 
carrier to noise density ratio (C/N0) monitoring can detect unusual power levels due to interference 
[12], stopband filtering mitigates out-of-band transmissions or adjacent energy spillover [3], pulse 
blanking can mitigate the effects of pulsed interference [17] [18], and notch filtering can be 
effective against continuous waves including the typical swept tones of PPDs [13]. Other more 
sophisticated anti-jamming measures include the use of controlled radiation pattern antenna 
(CRPA) jammer nulling or inertial measurement units (IMUs) [3]. 
 
Regarding interference caused by spoofing, this risk has been highlighted since at least 2003 [19] 
and the ease of building simple spoofers has been growing ever since [20] [21]. However different 
types of spoofers have to be distinguished as well as the know-how to build and operate complex 
spoofers. As with jamming, spoofing events have been observed, for example, recently in the Black 
Sea [22] and in the vicinity of the Kremlin [23]. Tests under laboratory conditions are reported in 
[24] and show the vulnerability of aeronautical receivers for different types of spoofing. 
Experimental results confirm the feasibility of certain attacks [25] [26]. 
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Regarding possible spoofing detection and mitigation, reference [19] proposes countermeasures at 
both the signal processing level (J/N, C/N0, antenna phase difference, deep acquisition), and 
navigation processing level (position/time checks, multisensory position consistency, and 
RAIM/FDE). In the last decade, spoofing has been demonstrated on multiple occasions for 
academic and research purposes [27] and several references provide an overview of some potential 
spoofing threats and countermeasures, including mathematical representations [28] (which is 
focusing on the observable and positioning layer and describing authentication schemes, however 
synchronization aspects are not explicitly handled) and attack and detection techniques based on 
current spoofer and receiver capabilities [29]. Investigations aiming at the assessment and design 
recommendations of a GNSS receiver’s signal processing layer are shown in [30] and [31], the 
latter particularizing the spoofing detection requirements, environments and possible 
countermeasures to the aviation domain. 
 
Nomenclature and Threat Categorization 
This section presents existing nomenclature for interference types, highlighting the pros and cons of 
that nomenclature in this context. This section then outlines a framework in order to present the 
range and types of emissions that avionics may experience.  
 
Intentional interference is generally referred to as interference whose purpose is to disrupt signal 
reception. Jammers such as PPDs may therefore fall into this category. However, such devices are 
not intentionally intended to interfere with air navigation services. Most effects of PPDs on air 
navigation services are collateral. Similarly, even though most GNSS repeaters are not placed to 
intentionally mislead avionics receivers, they represent an integrity threat comparable to some 
intentional spoofers, if not treated.  
 
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Radio Regulations (Vol 1, Art I, Sect VII) [32] 
define interference as "The effect of unwanted energy due to one or a combination of emissions, 
radiations, or inductions upon reception in a radiocommunication system, manifested by any 
performance degradation, misinterpretation, or loss of information which could be extracted in the 
absence of such unwanted energy". This definition relates interference to the effect in the receiver, 
as opposed to the source or the intention. ITU classifies interference as permissible, accepted or 
harmful, where harmful interference is defined as "Interference which endangers the functioning of 
a radionavigation service or of other safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs, or repeatedly 
interrupts a radiocommunication service operating in accordance with Radio Regulations". While 
the ITU definition does not explicitly mention jamming or spoofing, both are implicitly considered 
within the definition of interference, in the terms "performance degradation", "loss of information", 
and "misinterpretation". 
 
The proposed top-level types of harmful interference threats in this paper are Jamming and 
Spoofing, where: 
 
 Jamming denotes emissions that do not mimic GNSS signals, but rather interfere with the 
receiver’s ability to acquire and track GNSS signals.  
 Spoofing denotes emissions of GNSS-like signals that may be acquired and tracked in 
combination with or instead of the intended signals.  
 
This top-level categorization is irrespective of the intention of the emitter. Purely unintentional 
interference (e.g., an improperly installed GNSS repeater or mis-operated test equipment), collateral 
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interference (e.g., a PPD) or dedicated, malicious interference (e.g., a dedicated aircraft spoofer), 
are therefore all considered categories of Jamming and Spoofing. According to this definition, 
devices generating GNSS-like signals with PRN codes [3], sometimes referred to as smart jammers, 
will, despite their name, be considered as spoofing. Therefore, jamming threats generally lead to a 
denial of service and only affect continuity and availability, while spoofing threats can lead to an 
integrity failure if the spoofing signals are treated as valid GNSS signals and therefore spoofing 
threats are generally considered more dangerous. Nevertheless, since signal correlation and 
measurement generation processes are internal to the receiver, it cannot be a priori discarded that 
jamming threats can lead to incorrect or highly inaccurate propagated measurements in current 
receivers with integrity impacts as well. For example, the current SBAS MOPS mentions that 
"Excessive CW interference could cause large pseudorange errors" and proposes to treat 
interference in order to fulfil the requirement of Integrity in the Presence of Interference, S2.1.1.12, 
[8]. Similar requirements will be needed for the newly considered threats and one of the objectives 
of this framework is that future standards should address jamming threats in order to preclude 
possible integrity failures.  
 
Jamming 
J1 - Collateral Jammers 
J2 - High Power Interferers 
J3 - Targeted  Jammers 
J4 - Targeted Sophisticated Jammers 
  
 
Spoofing 
S1 – Repeaters 
S2 – Errant signals  
S3 - Collateral Spoofers – Simulators 
S4 - Collateral Re-radiating Spoofers 
S5 - Targeted Spoofers – Simulators 
S6 - Targeted Re-radiating Spoofers 
S7 - Targeted Sophisticated Spoofers 
 
  
 Table 1 – New Categorization of Interference Types, Jamming (J1-J4) and Spoofing (S1-S7) 
Table 1 presents a proposed means for interference categorization. It is intended to foster dialogue 
on the kinds of unwanted emissions that are possible and the effects on the receivers that need to be 
mitigated in the future standards.  As mentioned above, the categorization addresses emissions from 
jammers and spoofers; however, different types of emissions can result in similar effects. For 
example, radiofrequency systems whose accidental emissions lead to jamming are assimilated into 
the J2 - high-power interferers category term which is also used in reference [9].  
 
The term collateral is used when the aircraft is not the intended victim of the emission. However, 
this intent is not necessarily observable by the receiver.  What is observable is that the position, 
code chip phase, power levels, etc. of the false signals, are unlikely to be aligned with the 
corresponding values for the true signals at the user antenna.  Therefore, large positioning and 
pseudorange jumps can be expected as well as power levels that are either too weak or too strong.  
 
The term targeted is used when the emissions are intended to specifically affect one or more 
aircraft. In this case, some effort has been made to align the interfering signals so that errors may 
not be as obvious at the receiver. The term sophisticated is used when the interfering signals are in 
their hardest-to-detect conditions, for example when multiple signals may be arriving from different 
directions. 
 
The categories also take into account the anticipated effect in the receiver, the receiver response to 
the emission, and the general type of equipment required for the transmission. For example, while 
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S1- Repeaters and S3 - Collateral Spoofers–Simulators might trigger a similar detection response, 
they are considered in separate sub-categories, since the likelihood of encountering repeaters signals 
currently appears to be higher than the likelihood of encountering spoofers. Threats composed of a 
combination of threat categories will be categorized according to the most potentially harmful in the 
list (from J1 to S7), e.g. a targeted jamming (J3) + targeted spoofer re-radiation attack (S6) would 
be considered under S6, unless the resources and complexity required moves it into the category of 
sophisticated (S7). 
 
There are many other properties that can be used to model different threats within each category 
(e.g., whether or not an emitter is on board the aircraft or external).  The properties used were 
selected to provide a separation that reflects both the likelihood and vulnerability considering some 
previously investigated mitigations. This top-level separation can be revisited as the likelihood of 
various threats and their potential mitigations matures.   
 
What follows is a definition of each of the threats including some illustrative examples from the 
literature and reported events, when available. 
 
Jamming Categories 
 J1 - Collateral Jammers: Jammers emitting signals that do not contain GNSS-specific features 
(see general threat categories provided above), often with low power and limited range. These 
sources may have the purpose of jamming GNSS devices other than the avionics receiver. 
Examples of collateral jammers include mobile satellite services (MSS) handsets and mobile or 
static, single- or multi-frequency PPDs used by individuals for privacy purposes, such as 
described in references [11], [13] or [10].  These devices can be on board the aircraft. 
 
 J2 - High Power Interference: Misused military or civil transmitters or mis-operated test 
equipment which results in jamming over a broad area including regions with very high signal 
power. This definition is based on a definition by the FAA [9] that is extended to cover civil 
transmissions such as harmonics from FM or TV signals. For example, high power 3
rd
 order 
harmonics of 525 MHz UHF TV signals in the L1 band [4] [33] are included in this category. 
 
 J3 - Targeted Jammers: Jammers, e.g., those described in J1 or similar, when specifically 
operated against the aircraft. It includes the case where their power level remains sufficient to 
obscure the true signals for an extended period of time but perhaps not so high as to otherwise 
be easily detected. These jammers do not transmit GNSS-specific features, and are built, or 
procured, with limited resources; i.e., equipment and know-how is within reach through the 
internet at a low cost (~1000 USD). 
 
 J4 - Targeted Sophisticated Jammers:  Sophisticated jammers beyond the capabilities of J3, 
which include dedicated features to defeat existing jamming detectors or radio interference 
monitors. This category includes, for example, highly directive jammers such as jamming guns 
[23], or selective, intermittent jammers resulting in selective bit corruption or increased low 
power noise.  
 
Spoofing Categories 
 
 S1 – Repeaters: Devices rebroadcasting live GNSS signals from a fixed, or mobile position, 
typically used to improve indoor or in-vehicle coverage. For example, a misplaced or 
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misconfigured Galileo/GPS/GNSS repeater used for receiver signal acquisition within an airport 
hangar, whose signals leak out and spoof nearby aircraft receivers [34].  
 
 S2 - Errant Signals: A GNSS-like synthetic signal that is mistakenly taken for an operational 
GNSS signal. This category includes testing platforms transmitting signals which may mislead 
avionics receivers. For example, satellite-based test-beds [35], or ground-based test-beds [36] 
[37], if misconfigured, or misused, and transmit operational PRNs, would fall into this category. 
This category also includes pseudolites [38], generally intended to improve GNSS coverage and 
performance. Errant signals also includes PRN-like signal jammers that can be acquired and 
tracked by receivers resulting in false measurements [39].  
 
 S3 - Collateral Spoofers - Simulators: Spoofers that transmit synthetically-generated, GNSS-
like signals such as those discussed in reference [20] (case A. Simplistic Attack.), or more 
recently, in reference [40]. The aim is of these spoofers is to deceive other receivers, such as 
personal location devices, smartphones, or automotive receivers, or all receivers within a certain 
area [22]. Their purpose is not intended to specifically deceive an avionics receiver. Therefore, 
while their transmitted signals may be self-coherent, they would not be coherent with the 
dynamics and signals tracked by the aircraft. This category includes spoofers that introduce 
incorrect or invalid digital data and possibly erroneous ranging used in processing signals and 
the calculation of PNT. Data spoofing can result in a range of effects, from incorrect outputs of 
PNT to receiver malfunction. Onset of data spoofing effects can be instantaneous or delayed, 
and effects can persist long after the spoofing attack has ended.  False signals are unlikely to be 
aligned with the true signals and typically would lead to large, ranging/position jumps as well as 
power mismatches.   
 
 S4 - Collateral Re-radiating Spoofers: Spoofers that transmit GNSS-like signals based on real 
time reception of actual GNSS signals. This includes the re-radiation of the full signal stream, 
selective re-radiation of GNSS signals with potentially different delays, receiver-spoofers ( [20], 
B. Intermediate Attack), re-radiators of signals based on features from actual GNSS signals, 
including authenticated signals [41], or any combinations of the above. Their purpose is not to 
specifically deceive an avionics receiver. Therefore, this category’s transmitted signals may be 
self-coherent, but would not be coherent with the dynamics and signals tracked by the aircraft 
and could result in loss of situational awareness. These signals would typically lead to large, 
ranging/position jumps as well as power mismatches. 
 
 S5 - Targeted Spoofers - Simulators: Spoofers similar to S3, whose purpose is intended to 
deceive the avionics receiver.  Therefore, their transmitted signals must be self-coherent and are 
intended to cohere with the dynamics and signals tracked by the aircraft, with potential technical 
limitations in the attack. They may initially have well matched ranging/positioning errors and 
may be preceded with jamming in order to unlock the receiver from the true signals. This 
category includes spoofers that introduce incorrect or invalid digital data and possibly erroneous 
ranging targeting the avionics receiver for its use in processing signals and the calculation of 
PNT. Data spoofing can result in a range of effects, from incorrect outputs of PNT to receiver 
malfunction. Onset of data spoofing effects can be instantaneous or delayed, and effects can 
persist long after the spoofing attack has ended. This category is limited to spoofers using a 
single transmitter that is built or procured with limited resources; i.e., equipment and know-how 
within reach through the internet at low cost (~1000 USD). These spoofers cannot estimate the 
aircraft position below a few-meter level accuracy. 
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 S6 - Targeted Re-radiating Spoofers: Spoofers similar to S4, but whose intended purpose is to 
deceive the avionics receiver. Therefore, their transmitted signals must be self-coherent, and 
intended to cohere with the dynamics and signals tracked by the aircraft, provided the technical 
limitations of the attack. They may initially have well matched ranging/positioning errors and 
may be preceded with jamming in order to unlock the receiver from the true signals. This 
category is limited to spoofers using a single receiver-transmitter, built or procured with limited 
resources; i.e., equipment and know-how within reach through the internet at low cost (~1000 
USD). These spoofers cannot estimate the aircraft position below a few-meter level accuracy. 
Multiple targeted re-radiators that are not coherent with the dynamics and signals tracked by the 
aircraft can result in erroneous positioning and denial of positioning/navigation services. 
 
 S7 - Targeted Sophisticated Spoofers: Spoofers whose target is the avionics receiver with a 
higher degree of sophistication than S5 and S6. They may be even carrier phase-aligned at the 
victim receiver’s reception point, enabling the cancellation of the nominal signal (if the nominal 
signal is predictable). They include most coordinated multiple spoofing transmitter attacks, 
combined ground-based and air-based attacks, high accuracy aircraft location tracking, and 
attacks including combinations of the abovementioned threats requiring significant resources, 
etc.  
 
Although the framework may be useful for multiple purposes, it is intended as a tool for the 
development of user receiver requirements. The reader is reminded that GNSS is not intended as a 
single means of aircraft navigation, but a source of information for the pilot/aircraft, among others, 
including other navigation systems and visual aids to navigation. Therefore, even in case of 
successful sophisticated GNSS spoofing that is not mitigated in the GNSS receiver, its effects can 
be mitigated by the pilot under most circumstances, making the threat potentially less effective, at 
the current time, than other non-GNSS related threats, which are out of scope of this document. 
 
Assets to Protect, Use Case and Assumptions 
According to the ICAO standard, the main function of GNSS as a radionavigation aid is that it 
"shall provide position and time data to the aircraft" ( [7], 3.7.2.1.1). These position and time data 
are based on the GNSS signals providing GNSS measurements and data. As this framework relates 
to interference threats, receiver tampering threats were considered out of scope. Therefore, the 
assets to protect are the GNSS signals received by the receiver, including their carrier frequency and 
modulated spreading codes and data bits from which the measurements and data are extracted. 
 
Concerning the type of operations supported, ICAO Annex 10 [7] Vol 1, Table 3.7.2.4-1 lists 
signal-in-space performance requirements for different operations.  CAT-I precision approach is the 
most demanding operation listed in that table, particularly for the integrity requirement. The 
primary objective of this framework is to maintain integrity, CAT-I precision approach is the focus 
for this threat analysis.  The CAT-I requirements as listed in ICAO Annex 10 [7], Vol 1, Table 
3.7.2.4-1 are recalled in Table 2. 
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Accuracy 
horizontal 
95% 
Accuracy 
vertical 
95% 
Integrity Time-to-alert Continuity Availability 
16.0 m 
(52 ft) 
6.0 m to 4.0 m 
(20 ft to 13 ft) 
1 – 2 × 10–7 
in any 
approach 
6 s 1 – 8 × 10–6 
per 15 s 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
Table 2 – CAT-I requirements [7] 
 
Additional guidance is provided in Annex 10 for system requirements to support operations with a 
200 ft DA/H. Annex 10 also contains requirements to support lower than CAT-I minima operations.  
These requirements supplement those in Table 2.  Most notably, additional requirements at the 
pseudorange level are imposed, including for integrity. 
 
A relevant assumption for assessing the detection/mitigation measures, particularly of spoofing 
threats, is the initial state of the receiver. It is assumed in the use case, that the receiver is tracking 
valid signals and providing a valid PVT at the start of the precision approach. This assumption is 
also used in other spoofing mitigation references [29] [41] and is considered appropriate here, given 
the demanding conditions required for taking control of the signals in the previous phases of flight 
and maintaining control without the receiver detecting and rejecting those signals. It is also 
considered that the outcome of the threat analysis for the CAT-I use case is generally applicable for 
other phases of flight, except when noted. Surface operations can be also subject to 
jamming/spoofing with a similar likelihood. In these cases, the interference may be easier to detect 
at an airport, due to the presence of multiple aircraft that might detect the interference and 
especially if appropriate airport monitoring controls are deployed. These measures may protect 
start-up and acquisition processes, when a receiver may be most vulnerable to spoofing. However, 
the assumption that capabilities are available to detect jamming/spoofing threats is not valid for 
many start-up locations. 
 
While the focus of this paper is on CAT-I approach, the countermeasures are also applicable for 
other phases of flight or procedures (en-route, terminal, or other approach procedures demanding a 
lower GNSS performance). The countermeasures identified are generally applicable to an aircraft 
receiving valid GNSS signals, irrespective of the aircraft’s phase of flight; however, CAT-I and its 
integrity requirements was used as the assumed baseline. 
 
While the assumptions here presented are considered representative for this initial analysis, they 
will be validated in the process of modelling the threats and defining testing procedures for future 
standards. 
 
Threat Treatment and Detection/Mitigation Responses 
The treatment of the interference categories could be identified as: mandatory, recommended, 
future, or not applicable. The following definitions are offered to motivate discussion of the 
receiver minimum outputs and capabilities: 
 
 Mandatory: Threat to be treated in the next set of avionics receiver standards. 
 Recommended: Treatment of the threat in the next set of avionics standards is recommended 
but not mandatory and may be addressed at the aircraft level or by other means within the 
aircraft. 
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 Future: Possible treatment of the threat in future avionics standards. 
 
The assignment of the treatment is expected to be a collaborative community effort, first focusing 
on the foreseen or desirable allocation of mitigation responsibility to the receiver. 
 
The avionics are only one part of the air vehicle or platform-level system.  In addition to the GNSS 
antenna, other aircraft components may have essential roles in determining the navigation and 
guidance solution used by the pilot or autopilot.  The response of the avionics, the integrated air 
vehicle, and aircrew will ultimately determine the robustness against, or vulnerability to, the 
unwanted emissions. Planned responses need to consider real-time and maintenance actions. The 
following range of detection responses is envisaged: 
 
 None: No action taken. 
 Record: Record pertinent data about the event for later downloading and analysis. 
 Report: Transmit information about the event to ATC and or airline maintenance for potential 
subsequent action. 
 Alert (Advise/Caution): Provide information to dependent aircraft systems and/or the pilot that 
anomalies have been detected and the position may not be reliable. 
 Deny:  A valid GNSS solution is no longer provided. Relay information to other aircraft 
systems and/or the pilot that an alternate navigation source must be used. 
 Mitigate:  Prevent the anomaly from affecting the integrity of the GNSS solution; continue to 
operate using GNSS. 
 
Treatment actions related to detection (Record, Report, Advise/Caution and Deny) and Mitigate can 
be combined in the threat treatment. Recommendations on specific avionics, aircraft and pilot 
responses are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Countermeasures 
This section explores some possible detection and mitigation measures against the abovementioned 
threats. These potential mitigations are based on jamming and spoofing protections defined in the 
literature (e.g., reference [29] presents a similar exercise, but not particularized for the aviation use 
case and receivers) and on specific spoofing/ jamming mitigation techniques developed or assessed 
by the FAA for aviation use. This paper complements the countermeasures proposed in [31] with 
additional references and some traceability to the threat categories they can mitigate. Figure 1 
presents a list of potential countermeasures, grouped in blocks according to the applicable part of 
the receiver, or avionics, addressed, including the antenna, front end, signal processing (including 
all processes between ADC and tracking loop outputs), navigation (including measurement-level 
and PVT-level computations), platform (including all additional blocks that can be embedded in the 
receiver), and "other", to include countermeasures added at the operational procedures level, in the 
Flight Management Systems (FMS), or based on alternative navigation systems, which are not the 
focus of this work. Note that some of these techniques, or particular implementations may be 
covered by patents. The analysis of the intellectual property rights (IPR) status of the proposed 
techniques is beyond the scope of this paper. It should be noted that severe restrictions are imposed 
on inclusion of techniques covered by IPRs in avionics standards. 
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Figure 1 – Countermeasures 
What follows is a brief description of each countermeasure: 
 
 Multi-Element Antennas: Measures based on multi-element antennas. This 
countermeasure includes CRPA null techniques to null the direction of arrival of the 
jamming/spoofing source(s) [42] and other multi-element antenna techniques against 
jamming/spoofing as shown in [25] [43] [44]. They are effective against most interference 
threats. Their implementation complexity is a priori high and in principle most potential 
options are out of scope for initial next-generation equipment due to cost and export 
restrictions. 
 
 Single-Element Antennas: Measures based on single-element LHCP/RHCP antennas [45] 
[46] or related to elevation masking to limit/prevent emissions from low or below-zero 
elevation sources [47]. Elevation measures, while useful in some cases, may not be 
sufficient for threats to surface operations, takeoff, or jamming/spoofing emissions from 
middle elevations (e.g., hilltops or buildings). Masking applied above the typical elevation 
mask can degrade performance due to the reduction in number of available satellites. 
 
 AGC&C/N0: AGC [48] and C/N0 are complementary countermeasures and are proposed to 
be used in combination [49]. They are available within the receiver so the implementation 
complexity is low. AGC&C/N0 are useful for detecting all threats, particularly jamming (J1, 
J2, J3) and non-targeted, non-sophisticated spoofing (especially S1). AGC&C/N0 
monitoring detects abnormal power emissions and is also effective in combination with 
other measures (e.g., peak monitoring and rover channels) for other types of spoofing, 
including targeted and sophisticated spoofing (S3-S7). These techniques may also be 
effective to detect S2 unless errant signals are received at similar power levels as GNSS 
signals. 
 
 Filtering: Filtering at the receiver RF front end (RFFE) and signal processing are grouped 
together in this countermeasure category. Filtering includes analog or digital filters such as 
stopband filters to filter signals in the adjacent bands (J2) or notch filters [13] for CW/swept 
tones of jammers (J1, J3). Filter implementation complexity can be medium or high, 
depending on the filtering scheme and the receiver design. 
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 Pulse Blanking: Includes measures to mitigate pulsed interference (J2), such as those 
already used for DME/TACAN pulse mitigation in the L5 band [50]. Pulse blanking can be 
implemented at a low/medium complexity. 
 
 Peak Monitoring and Control Loop Parametrization: Includes protection measures 
based e.g. on the use of several correlators to detect peak forms that may suggest targeted 
spoofing tracking loop liftoff attacks (S5, S6, S7), as e.g., described in reference [29] as 
Correlation function distortion monitoring or reference [49]. Peak monitoring requires 
additional correlators per channel compared to standard correlator implementations. 
Implementation complexity is considered medium/high, depending on the availability of 
correlators. Simultaneous tracking of the nominal and spoofing peak (for overlapping peaks) 
is shown in [51]. Regarding control loop parametrization to force spoofers to synchronize 
with the authentic signals, an investigation aimed at evaluating robust configurations (i.e. 
requiring a higher level of synchronization of the spoofer in terms of frequency offset and 
time delay) of the receiver loops can be found in [30].  
 
 Rover Channels: Includes protection measures based on a continuous acquisition process to 
detect correlation peaks around the tracking peak from spoofing signals or vestigial signals, 
if already under influence of spoofing [52] [19]. Rover channels can prove very useful to 
detect all kinds of spoofing (S1-S7), and particularly targeted spoofing (S5, S6, S7). 
Maximum benefits are provided by continuous acquisition and tracking. Implementation 
complexity is considered medium/high. 
 
 Spreading Code Authentication: Includes spreading code authentication in GNSS ARNS 
signals, receiver sample storage and cryptographic functions (first presented in reference 
[19], as Spread Spectrum Security Codes, or SSSC). This mitigation is useful against 
spoofing, especially against simulated signals (S2, S3, S5). Spreading code authentication is 
not foreseen to be added in the near-term by GNSS providers in the ARNS bands. 
 
 Consistency Checks: Includes all types of GNSS consistency checks at the Measurement, 
Position, Velocity, Time and Frequency level. It is considered very effective to detect and 
sometimes mitigate non-targeted spoofing (S1-S4) at a low complexity (software-level 
modification). Consistency checks include: 
o Measurement consistency over time; e.g., pseudorange jumps based on a step detector, 
as already addressed in the MOPS ( [8], 2.1.1.5.1). Consistency checks can detect abrupt 
measurement jumps from non-targeted spoofing and errant signals (S1, S2, S3, S4). 
o RAIM/FDE, including consistency checks of measurements at a given position fix and 
the detection of faulty, inconsistent measurements. The measure can be effective against 
unintended (S1, S2) and collateral spoofing (S3, S4), particularly in transitional times 
when the receiver tracks a majority of valid signals and a minority of spoofing signals.  
o Position and Velocity checks over time, including abnormal position, sudden jumps due 
to tracking repeater signals (S1), a static or slow-moving position reported (S1, S3, S4), 
or any changes not consistent with the aircraft dynamic model. 
o Time and Frequency checks over time, including time jumps in disagreement with the 
expected receiver clock oscillator stability (e.g., S3, S5), or abnormal clock frequency 
drifts induced by a spoofer delaying the signal stream (S6, time-based meaconing 
attacks) [29]. Mitigations can also include time comparisons between trusted time 
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sources (obtained, e.g., at startup in a controlled environment, and later time 
measurements e.g., before start of an approach). 
o Navigation data checks, including checking that the SBAS, IODC/IODE or other data 
are within valid ranges, and there are no abnormal values, or data sequencing overtime, 
avoiding incorrect PNT outputs or receiver malfunction [53]. Navigation data checks 
may help preclude S2 (if errant signals have abnormal data) or S3-S5 (simulators). 
o Aircraft level checks using independent measurements (e.g., cross-checks with IRU and 
other navigation sensors and timing sources). 
 
 Navigation Message Authentication (NMA): This countermeasure will be included in the 
Galileo Open Service [54] [55] and is also under study for GPS [56] [57] and SBAS [58] 
[59]. NMA ensures navigation data authenticity by cryptographic authentication through 
digital signatures or equivalent protocols. This mitigation would require a software-level 
implementation for the cryptographic operations and a mechanism for receipt and storage of 
a public key in the receiver. Cryptographic information can be updated generally over the air 
and sporadically through other means. Medium implementation complexity (software level). 
Requires cryptographic protocol and management of the public keys. NMA is effective in 
detecting all simulated signals (S2, S3, S5) in isolation and re-radiators (S1, S4, S6) when 
combined with signal replay detection and consistency checks. If lightweight cryptographic 
protocols such as TESLA [60] are used, detection may require loose time synchronization 
obtained from a time consistency check. The authentication verification requires additional 
time which depends on the format of the message. 
 
 Signal Replay Detection: Requires unpredictable signals using NMA or spreading code 
authentication (SCA) and dedicated signal processing, including partial signal accumulation 
and later verification upon reception of the cryptographic information [41]. Effectiveness 
depends on the signal used, in particular, the amount and periodicity of unpredictable codes, 
and whether the detection capability is implemented at code, or symbol level, since code-
based features of SCA are more difficult to replay than symbol-based features of NMA.  
This capability also depends on the implementation of receiver anti-replay checks [61]. 
Receiver complexity is medium/high depending on the technique employed. Useful against 
re-radiators and sophisticated spoofing (S4, S6, S7). In the case of NMA, vulnerabilities of 
the channel coding may be exploited [62] if the unpredictable symbols are not properly 
chosen [63]. 
 
 Inertial Measurement Units (IMUs): Useful for detection of all jamming and spoofing 
threats (J1-S7) where the GNSS and IMU information is inconsistent.  Can also provide 
mitigation by coasting on the IMU position while the GNSS signals are unavailable or 
declared/suspected to be under threat. An IMU may, or may not, be integrated in the GNSS 
receiver. The IMU may, or may not, rely on the GNSS for initialization and bias estimation. 
Some benefits may be achievable with a less than traditional navigation grade IMU. An 
aviation anti-spoofing approach based on IMUs is described in [64]. 
 
 Independent Clock Reference:  This is a generic category that includes countermeasures 
based on additional clock-related hardware and therefore excludes the timing consistency 
checks addressed above. Application of this mitigation capability may require the use of a 
more stable, independent oscillator (e.g., a chip scale atomic clock (CSAC) or real-time 
clock (RTC) for loose time synchronization).  
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Figure 2 – Conceptual figure of jamming/spoofing countermeasures, including AGC&C/N0, rover channel, peak 
monitoring, anti-replay, NMA, and consistency checks at measurement / PVTF level 
 
Figure 2 represents the proposed countermeasures in relation to the processing of a GNSS signal, 
and the generation of the measurements and data for the PVT computation. The AGC & C/N0 
defends from threats raising the interference power level by detecting, for example, high-power 
spoofing pushing vestigial signals at the post-correlation stage below the noise floor. The rover 
channel can defend the surroundings of the valid signal peak in both frequency and time and 
prevent spoofing attacks whereby a spoofing signal approaches and crosses the tracking loop to take 
control over the loop. Peak monitoring protects the tracking peak by detecting abnormal peak 
shapes from a spoofer that are roughly synchronized at the code level with the valid signals. In 
addition, anti-replay measures (requiring signal/data authentication and unpredictable signal 
features) force spoofers to estimate and replay the signal, adding a delay to a spoofed signal, or 
abnormal patterns on the unpredictable parts of the signal. Beyond the signal processing domain, 
NMA ensures that the data that is demodulated is authentic and provides signal unpredictability 
features that can be used against replay attacks. Note that an attacker might roughly synchronize the 
threat signal with the valid one, force a cycle slip and take control of the PLL and modify the data, 
if not authenticated. Inconsistency of the measurements can be detected through measurement 
consistency checks, and position, velocity, time and frequency (PVTF) consistency over time can be 
checked as well. The figure does not include desirable platform-level measures, such as consistency 
checks with IMU/INS, other independent sensors, or external clocks.  
 
Multipath, which also includes GNSS-like signals, has not been included explicitly for the scope of 
this work as, while it can affect the position, it cannot be considered as a jamming/spoofing threat. 
It will always be a delayed version of the nominal PRN sequence received from the satellite. The 
received power is always lower. The satellite signals impinge from different directions. Therefore 
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multipath signals will affect the PRNs differently and are therefore not self-coherent. Modeling 
approaches for airborne multipath are discussed in [65] or [66], and proposed countermeasures must 
be able to discern between multipath and spoofing signals in order to avoid false alerts. 
 
Combinations of Countermeasures 
Out of the above countermeasures, some combinations seem particularly effective to mitigate many 
of the identified threats, yet simple to implement. The following is a first iteration toward defining a 
group of countermeasures that could be implemented considering their expected complexity and 
potential effectiveness. Once the threat model is defined in more detail, the effectiveness of these 
combinations must be re-verified. Any of the following combinations can have a higher degree of 
robustness by the addition of independent navigation (e.g., INS) or timing (independent clock) 
measures. From lowest to highest complexity, some possible combinations are: 
 
1. AGC&C/N0 with consistency checks: This combination can detect various non-targeted 
threats (J1, J2, J3 through AGC&C/N0, and S1, S3, S4 through consistency checks, although 
these checks may prove insufficient against targeted spoofing (S5-S7) and some S2 cases 
(e.g., an errant SBAS-like signal used as a data channel only). 
 
2. AGC&C/N0 with consistency checks and NMA: With the addition of NMA, this 
combination can protect against all the threats in combination 1, plus guarantees the source 
of the data in all cases and the signal sources, in all instances except re-radiation. This 
measure adds protection capability against all S2 and S5 threats in addition to those in 
combination 1. 
 
3. AGC&C/N0 with consistency checks, roving channel, and peak monitoring/control loop 
parametrization: In addition to the threats protected in combination 1 (J1, J2, J3, S1, S3, 
S4), these techniques may provide improved protection against targeted attacks (S5, S6, S7), 
provided these attacks do not align with the valid signal at the code level and modify the 
data. Otherwise peak monitoring techniques may detect signals which are not fully aligned. 
 
4. AGC&C/N0 with consistency checks, roving channel, peak monitoring/control loop 
parametrization, NMA, and anti-replay: In addition to combination 3, NMA prevents the 
possibility of data modification (which may be the simplest targeted attack for signal-
protected receivers). And, the anti-replay feature protects against most anti-replay attacks 
(except potentially highly sophisticated targeted spoofing attacks under S7). 
 
In addition, IMUs [64], or other independent positioning sources and independent accurate time 
references, will improve the detection and mitigation capabilities of all of the above combinations.  
 
Summary 
A framework for categorizing emissions is described to enable discussion and to support the 
development of future aviation standards with protections against jamming and spoofing. This 
framework divides the emissions into 11 categories, 4 for jamming and 7 for spoofing, based upon  
a broad view of such interference, including collateral and targeted threats from different types of 
equipment and sophistication. A CAT-I approach is assumed as a use case to assess the possible 
countermeasure effectiveness. Protections for CAT-I operation are considered likely valid for other 
flight phases as well. A fairly exhaustive set of countermeasures is proposed based upon both the 
generic and aviation-specific work that was available on jamming and spoofing mitigation 
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measures, including measures at all stages of the avionics receiver (antenna, RFFE, signal 
processing, navigation, platform). Based on the effectiveness and easiness of implementation, 
countermeasures are grouped in four combinations, from AGC & C/N0 and consistency checks 
alone, to AGC & C/N0, consistency checks, authentication and signal processing measures (rover 
channel, peak monitoring, anti-replay). All of the combinations can be supported by the use of 
IMUs and independent clocks. 
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